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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
are cited as authority, and therefore the present status of the law seems
to be that suits cannot be maintained to recover on contracts growing out
of violations of the Sunday labor law.
R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 3599 prohibits the exposing to sale of goods on
Sunday'70 and the following section (Sec. 3600) excepts sales of drugs
or medicines, provisions or other articles of immediate necessity. Under
these statutes the sale of tobacco on Sunday is unlawful,11 as is ex-
posing for sale, and selling groceries, meats and feed, unless the neces-
sity for them is urgent and immediate. The "necessity" spoken of in
Sec. 3600 must be of such character that it could not reasonably have
been foreseen or guarded against. 17 2 Selling lemons was approved as
being both a medicine and a food and within Sec. 3600.173 In view of
the statutes prohibiting the exposing to sale of goods, and the fact that
the "necessity" must be urgent and immediate, there is, no doubt, much
goods sold in Missouri on Sunday in violation of the law.
The law prohibiting sales of goods on Sunday makes no exception for
members of a religious society by whom some other day of the week
is observed, whereas the Sunday labor law makes such an exception (in
Sec. 3597).174
It seems that the general laws in Missouri making it unlawful to labor
or sell goods on Sunday are as strict as those of any state. At the
present time, the laws of Massachusetts pertaining to labor and sales are
more liberal than those of Missouri, although the former state is gen-
erally regarded as a "Blue Law" state. In Massachusetts, the sale of
ice cream, tobacco and some other goods is expressly made lawful, and
even bootblacks may labor until eleven o'clock on Sunday,1'7 whereas
in Missouri to be lawful the labor must be "necessity or charity," or per-
formed in the operation of ferry boats, or performed by one observing
another day ;178 and the sales must be of "drugs or medicines, provisions
or other articles of immediate necessity."' 177
C. SIDNEY NEUIHOFF.
RIGHT OF WOMEN TO SERVE ON JURIES IN MISSOURI*
You have asked us for our opinion on the question whether, in order
to qualify women for jury service in Missouri, it will be necessary first
to obtain an amendment to the State Constitution, or whether the re-
sult can be accomplished without an amendment to the Constitution and
only by Legislation.
The question whether a Constitutional amendment is necessary arises
2"0Supra, footnote 133.
"' State v. Ohmer, 34 Mo. App. 115.
... State v. Hogan, 212 Mo. App. 473, 252 S. W. 90.
17 State v. Campbell, 206 Mo. 579, 105 S. W. 637.
... State v. Hogan, supra, footnote 172.
... See Massachusetts General Laws-1921, Ch. 136, Sec. 6.
" Supra, footnote 132.
'
7 Supra, footnote 133.
*This article was written by E. M. Grossman, and George A. McNulty in re-
sponse to a request by the Missouri League of Women Voters for an opinion
on the question.
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from the fact that our Constitution (Section 28 Article II) says that
in courts not of record (inferior courts such as justice of the Peace
and Police courts) a jury "may consist of less than twelve men" and
that the "grand jury shall consist of twelve men." Does the use of the
word "men" in this section of the Constitution mean that only males
may be jurors? Or is the word used in a generic sense, meaning human
beings collectively?
Section 28 of Article II of the Constitution of Missouri reads as
follows:
Sec. 28. Trial by Jury Inviolate-Majority Verdicts-Grand
Jury, Twelve Men.-The right of trial by jury, as heretofore
enjoyed, shall remain inviolate; but a jury for the trial of
criminal or civil cases, in courts not of record, may consist of less
than twelve men, as may be prescribed by law; and that a two-
thirds majority of such number prescribed by law concurring may
render a verdict in all civil cases. And that in the trial by jury of
all civil cases in courts of record, three-fourths of the members of
the jury concurring may render a verdict. Hereafter, a grand
jury shall consist of twelve men, any nine of whom concurring
may find an indictment or a true bill: Provided, however, that no
grand jury shall be convened except upon an order of a judge of
a court having the power to try and determine felonies; but when
so assembled such grand jury shall have power to investigate and
return indictments for all character and grades of crime.
In our opinion this section does not attempt to fix the qualifications
of jurors. The clauses in which the word "men" is used deal only with
the number of jurors that must compose juries. Secondly, it is our
opinion that the word "men," as used in this section, is used in its
generic sense and therefore includes women. Thirdly, it is our opinion
that it is for the Legislature alone to fix the qualifications of jurors.
That the word "men," as used in the above section, may include
women is confirmed by the authorities:'
Our Legislature has declared that with respect to statutes pertaining
to crimes and punishments "words importing the masculine gender only
may be extended to females also" (R. S. Mo. 1919 Sec. 3720). And
in Chapter 57 R. S. Mo. 1919 entitled Laws and particularly in Section
7055 Article II thereof entitled Construction of Statutes it is provided:
Sec. 7055. Words in the Masculine Gender Include What-
When any subject-matter, party or person is described or referred
to by words importing the singular number or the masculine gender,
several matters and persons, and females as well as males, and
bodies corporate as well as individuals, shall be deemed to be in-
cluded.
138 C. J. 521; 2 Bouv. Law Dictionary, p. 2073; Black's Law Dictionary; State
v. Seiler, 106 Wis. 346, 82 N. W. 167; Turner's Adm'rs v. Whitten, 40 Ala. 530;
Anderson v. State, 117 Ga. 255; Hightower v. State, 14 Ga. App. 246; Eichorn v.
Missouri, 130 Mo. 575; Rockliffe v. Seal, 36 Mo. 317; State ex rel. v. Hostetter,
137 Mo. 636.
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Our own Supreme Court has held that the rules enacted by the Legis-
lature for the construction of statutes apply as well to the construction
of the Constitution.
2
The Hostetter Case is especially interesting because it holds that
women are not disqualified from taking office by the use of the pronoun
"his" in Article 8, section 12. Judge Barclay declared the law to be
that "where persons are referred to by words importing the masculine
gender, females as well as males shall be deemed included thereby, un-
less a contrary intent appears by the context or otherwise. '"
3
Another well established principle which must be borne in mind is
stated in Collard v. Springfield, supra, note 2:
The Constitution of Missouri was designed by its framers to be
a single, symmetrical and harmonious chart of government, free
from repugnancy and conflict in any of its provisions.
Having this principle in mind we cannot read Article II of the Con-
stitution, which is entitled Bill of Rights, without being driven to the
conclusion that the masculine noun and pronoun used in the Constitu-
tion meant by the framers to apply likewise to women. Section 5 of
the Bill of Rights declares "that all men have a natural and indefeasible
right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
conscience . . . ." Section 13 defines treason and uses the masculine
pronoun. Section 14 guarantees freedom of speech and that again uses
the masculine pronoun only. Section 17 preserves to every citizen the
right to bear arms in defense of "his home, person and property." Sec-
tion 22 guarantees certain rights to the accused in criminal prosecutions
and there again the masculine pronoun only is used. Section 23 pro-
tects persons against being compelled to testify against themselves in
criminal cases and also protects them against being placed twice in
jeopardy and uses the masculine pronoun only. Of course no one will
contend that the rights preserved to us in some of the sections of
' State ex rel. v. Immel, 242 Mo. 393; Collard v. Springfield, 264 Mo. 296; State
ex rel. v. Hostetter 137 Mo. 636.
'137 Mo. 1. c. 647.
The Hostetter case is quoted and followed in the recent case of Dickson v.
Strickland, 265 S. W. 1012, involving the right of Mrs. Miriam A. Ferguson to
hold the office of governor of Texas. The constitution of that state repeatedly
refers to the governor as "he" or "him," and to the duties as the duties of "his"
office. Commenting on these words the court said:
"Since we have no English word, which in the singular number, includes
both 'he' and 'she,' the most appropriate word under common usage, to in-
clude both sexes while using the singular number, is the word 'he.' The
context of the Constitution, as a whole, plainly reveals the sense in which
'he' is used. Cooley says: 'As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the
same word is used in the same sense wherever it occurs in a Constitution.!
That 'he' must include 'she' is obvious when we read such sections as sec-
tion 10 of article 1, where, in stating the rights of the accused in criminal
prosecutions the following language is used:
'He shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion against him . . . He shall not be compelled to give evidence against
hirmself etc."
In line with reasoning the court reached the unanimous conclusion that a
woman could hold the office of governor.-ED.
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Article II of the Constitution are limited to males only. And yet to
hold that the word "men" and the masculine pronoun used in the sec-
tions we have just referred to applies to women as well as to men and
at the same time to hold that the word "men" as used in Section 28 of
the same article applies only to males is to violate the principle that
"The Constitution of Missouri was designed by its framers to be a
single, symmetrical and harmonious chart of government, free from
repugnancy and conflict in any of its provisions."
In the case of State v. Chase,' (1923), followed in the case of State
v. Putney,5 (1924), the statute which the Oregon Legislature had passed
qualifying women as jurors was held to be Constitutional.
The common sense view of the whole matter is that the inten-
tion of the framers of the Constitution was to insure to a criminal
defendant the right guaranteed by Magna Charta, namely, a trial
by an impartial jury of his peers leaving details, as to competency
and method of selection to the legislature. Women are now the
peers of men politically and there is no reason to question their
eligibility upon constitutional grounds.
"The fact that a common law jury was defined to be a 'jury of
twelve men' etc., had its origin in the circumstance of the political
servitude of women in the early days of judicial history so that
they were not 'peers' of a man accused of crime. In the broad
sense of the word they are now 'freemen' and neither the Con-
stitution nor the laws when they use the term 'men,' except in rare
instances, use it with reference to sex. Thus in Section 1 of the
Bill of Rights, which declare that all 'men' are equal in right, in Sec-
tion 2 which provides that all 'men' shall be 'secured in their natural
right to worship Almighty God,' etc. and in Section 10, which de-
clares that 'every man shall have remedy by due course of law for
injury done him in his person, property or reputation,' nobody
would contend that women are not included.
A Michigan statute had fixed as one of the qualifications of jurors
that they must be electors. But the Constitution of Michigan, just as
the Constitution of Missouri, specifically stated that juries in courts
not of record "may consist of less than twelve men." The Supreme
Court of Michigan held that the term "men" in the Constitution was
used generically and included women.,
Iowa also had a statute qualifying electors for jury service and there
again the Constitution fixed the number of jurors in inferior courts at
"less than twelve men." The Supreme Court of Iowa held that, not-
withstanding the use of the word "men" in the Constitution, inasmuch
as the Nineteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution made women
electors they were qualified for jury service. In the case of State v.
Walker,T; later followed in State v. Hickman8 (1923) the Court said:
' 106 Ore. 263.
'110 Ore. 634.
'People v. Barltz, 212 Mich. 580, 180 N. W. 423, 12 A. L. R. 520, (1920); Peo-
ple v Merhige, 219 Mich. 95, (1922).
'192 Iowa 283, 185 N. W. 619. '195 Iowa 765.
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It is the number that is guaranteed by our Constitution and
nowhere therein are qualifications of jurors defined or limited.
The essential elements for a trial by jury at common law are num-
ber, impartiality and unanimity. 16 R. C. L. 181. It is the ac-
cepted law that the Legislature may fix the qualifications of jurors,
even though the qualifications are different from those existing at
common law. * * * The common law concept of a jury which the
original Constitution makers had in mind need not be respected in
its entirety in order that 'the right of trial by jury shall remain in-
violate.' This concept is primarily one of historical significance,
and we are not bound in the interpretation of a jury under the
fundamental law of Iowa to construe the word 'men' other than in
its generic sense.
In the case of State v. James,9 (1921) the Court said:
"But our Constitutional provisions in no way trammel legislative
power with reference to the qualifications of jurors."
In Commonwealth v. Maxwell,0 the Court held that the Nineteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution qualified women as electors and
that therefore as such they were entitled to perform jury service and
said:
The qualifications of jurors and mode of selecting them are
usually statutory. 16 R. C. L. 234 * * * They are not essential
elements of trial by jury and so are not within the Constitutional
guarantee.
In Smith v. Times,"" the Court said:
It was never intended to tie up the hands of the legislature so
that no regulations of the trial by jury could be made; * * * all
the authorities agree that the substantial features * * * are the
number twelve, and the unanimity of the verdict.
In Palmer v. State,"2 (Feb. 1926), the Court held that the Nineteenth
Amendment qualified women for jury duty under the Indiana statute
which provided that jurors must be selected from qualified electors and
the Court said:
It is now settled, beyond any controversy, that qualifications of
jurors are matters of legislative control, even though the qualifica-
tions laid down by the legislature differ from those of the common
law.
In Tynor v. U. S.,"1 (1924), the U. S. Court of Appeals while dis-
cussing an Alaska statute qualifying women for jury service said:
96 N. J. L. 132, 16 A. L. R. 1141.
"271 Pa. 378, 114 AtI. 825.at 178 Pa. 481, 35 L. R. A. 819.
(Ind.) 150 N. E. 917.
297 Fed. 177.
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The contention that the act is inconsistent with the Constitution
of the United States is based upon the claim that a common law
jury must necessarily consist of men only, and that women are in-
competent. The competency of women to sit on grand and petit
juries has been the subject of much consideration in recent years,
and more especially since the adoption of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States. So far as we are
advised, it has been uniformally held that to prescribe the qualifica-
tions of jurors and the mode of their selection, is a proper and
rightful subject of legislation, and that acts similar to the Alaska
act in question do not violate constitutional provisions similar to
the provision of the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States.
The Justices of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts reached the con-
clusion that it was within the power of the legislature to qualify women
as jurors.14
A Nevada statute qualifying women for jury duty was held constitu-
tional.15 Minnesota,16 and California 7 have decisions to the same effect.
A final argument that the Missouri Constitution does not bar women
from jury service is the fact that in 1921 that Constitution was amended
so as to qualify women to hold office. Similar amendments to the con-
stitutions of Minnesota and California respectively were stressed in the
opinions of the two cases above cited:
Women may be elected to the judicial office. It would be a
strange anomaly if they could not sit as jurors. 8
Our Constitution also expressly provides (art. 20 section 18):
'No person shall, on account of sex, be disqualified from entering
upon or pursuing any lawful business vocation or profession.'
And while service is neither a 'business, vocation, or profession,'
the Constitution recognizes the capacity of women to enter upon
any 'lawful business, vocation, or profession.' By an amendment
to our Constitution, October 10, 1911 (art. 2, sect. 1), women were
given the right to vote and hold office. If the contention of the
petitioner is well grounded, we would then have a situation where a
woman on trial for a crime might be brought to trial before a woman
judge, prosecuted by a woman district attorney, defended by a
woman lawyer, brought in court by a woman bailiff, and yet forced
to a trial before a jury of men, because men only were considered
as eligible for jury duty at common law. It would seem that the
inferences to be derived from so radical an amendment of the
Constitution are quite as strong as those to be derived from the use
of the term 'Trial by jury.'
We have discovered but one intimation that a constitutional provision
"'In re Opinion of the Justices, 237 Mass. 591, 130 N. E. 685.
Parus v. Dist. Court, 42 Nev. 229, 174 Pac. 706, 4 A. L. R. 140, (1918).
State v. Rosenberg, 192 N. W. 194.
In re Maya, 178 Cal. 213, 172 Pac. 986, L. R. A. 1918 E. 771.
See Note 16.
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such as is contained in Section 28 of Article II of the Constitution of
Missouri might prevent a legislature qualifying women to serve as
jurors. It is contained in the opinion of State v. Mittle,19 1922. A
male defendant had moved to quash the venire upon the ground that all
women electors had been excluded. His motion was denied and, after
conviction, he appealed. The judgment was of course affirmed upon
the unquestionable ground that it did not lie in his mouth to make the
objection because he was not one of the class excluded. The court
however-wholly without warrant we submit-took upon itself to de-
liver an opinion as to whether women were qualified jurors in South
Carolina.
Its first proposition is that the Nineteenth Amendment did not of it-
self confer the right of suffrage-is indubitably correct. So is its sec-
ond: That even if the Nineteenth Amendment did give females the
right to vote, that right did not necessarily carry with it the right to
serve as a juror. The court, however, felt the need of still further ut-
terance and delivered itself of the following:
Not being implied in the Nineteenth Amendment, the right of
jury service is expressly denied by the State Constitution (Article
5, section 22), 'The petit jury of the Circuit Courts shall consist of
twelve men.' The further provision in that section, 'Each juror
must be a qualified elector,' does not confer upon every elector,
male or female, the right of jury service. It means that every
juror must be a qualified elector, not that every qualified elector
shall be a qualified juror.
This gratuitous dictum does not, in our opinion, present a basis
which the Missouri Courts are likely to use as a point of departure from
the square decisions herein cited that women may be qualified as jurors
under constitutional provisions which speak of a jury of "men."
We therefore conclude that the word "men" as used in the Constitu-
tion of Missouri is used in its generic sense and that it is for the State
Legislature to fix the qualifications of jurors. Therefore, we believe
that in order to qualify women for jury service in Missouri an amend-
ment to our Constitution is not necessary.
Our Legislature has, however, fixed as a qualification for jurors that
they must be of the male sex. Section 6607 R. S. Mo. provides:
Every juror, grand and petit, shall be a male citizen of the state,
resident of the county, sober and intelligent, of good reputation,
over twenty-one years of age and otherwise qualified.
It is our opinion that by the adoption of an amendment by our Legis-
lature, removing this restriction, women will be qualified for jury service
in Missouri.
-113 S. E. (S. C.) 335.
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